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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

Thus, the court enjoined them from such delivery of water without
written consent of Port and awarded damages.
The judgment
additionally gave Port exclusive right to operate the water delivery
system providipg Port did not interfere with the Ayletts' right to
uninterrupted use of the system on Section 21. The trial court also
stated Port had the right to charge the Ayletts actual costs of future use
of the irrigation system for delivery of water to Section 21.
On appeal to the Oregon Court of Appeals, the Ayletts made two
arguments concerning the ruling: (1) that the relief granted went
beyond the relief sought and the additional terms were erroneous in
light of Port's assurances that those issues were not before the court
and would be litigated at a later date if necessary; and (2) that the trial
court erred as a matter of law because previous 1993 litigation
established the Ayletts' right to operate the irrigation system. The
court here agreed with the Ayletts' first argument and thus did not
address the second. The court likened the Ayletts' case to Ellison v.
Watson where the relief erroneously granted by the court concerned
subject matter that was not only not the grounds for litigation but was
specifically disavowed by the party seeking relief. Port argues that the
present case is distinguishable from Ellison because the relief at issue in
the instant case was "logically connected" to the relief requested. The
court rejected the connection argument because it failed to see a
connection between the Ayletts' rights to irrigate Sections 27 and 28
and the amount that Port could charge defendant to irrigate Section
21.
Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's ruling on the issue
of additional relief and remanded for entry of an amended judgment.
The court otherwise affirmed the judgment.
GerrittJames Koser

Hale v. Water Res. Dep't, 55 P.3d 497 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (holding
that lack of continuity regarding beneficial use barred plaintiffs from
receiving a permit to use river water for irrigation).
In 1965, the Water Resources Department ("Department") created
Permit 30789 ("Permit"), allowing for the Stanfield Irrigation District,
including Robert Hoskins and Ralph and Albert Seibel, to divert water
from the Umatilla River for irrigation. The Department would grant a
permit if the parties, within the district, applying could establish that
they were putting water to beneficial use. At the final application
deadline-December 31, 1988-the Department determined whether
the district was using the water beneficially by conducting a survey.
Hoskins and the Seibels, owners of two adjacent sections of land, both
sought permits. The Seibel brothers were attempting to irrigate both
the land they owned as well as the neighboring section they leased
from Hoskins. The irrigation began in the early 1970s but ceased in
the early 1980s due to one of the brothers' illness. At this time, the
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brothers advised other irrigators in the region of their intention to
discontinue their Permit. In 1989, the Department made its final
determination of proof for those asserting Permit rights and
determined that neither Hoskins' nor the Seibel brothers' used the
water beneficially.
The Seibel brothers sold their section of property to Rick Hale in
1991. In 1997, Hale and Hoskins requested a hearing to argue that
since the two sections had been put to beneficial use for some
duration in the past, the Department's 1989 cancellation of their
Permit rights was in error. The hearing officer disagreed, and
affirmed the 1989 finding made by the Department, stating that
"continuity" was implicit in the definition of beneficial use. Hoskins
and Hale appealed to the Oregon Court of Appeals.
At issue was the definition of a "perfected" water right within the
context of the Department's 1989 decision. Hoskins and Hale argued
that "perfection" was a term of art that could refer to a single incident
where water was briefly put to beneficial use. The Department argued
whether a right had been "perfected" was left solely to the
Department's discretion. The Court of Appeals held that where an
agency's interpretation of law is at issue, the standard of review
depends on whether the term in question is an exact term, an inexact
term, or a delegative term. Here, the court labeled "perfected" a
delegative term, meaning it expressed "incomplete legislative meaning
that the agency is authorized to complete." Thus, the Department had
the authority to define "perfected" as it saw fit.
The court's second responsibility was to review the Department's
decision to deny Hoskins' and Hale's Permits to determine whether it
was within the "range of discretion allowed by the general policy of the
statute." The Oregon Supreme Court has held that continuity is
implicitly contained within the meaning of "beneficial use." Also,
Oregon law provides that where there is a gap of five successive years
between beneficial uses, "there is a rebuttable presumption of
forfeiture of all or part of the water right." Finally, the Water Rights
Act explicitly states that for the Department to grant a permit,
appropriation alone does not suffice; there must also be a beneficial
use in effect when the Department makes its final determination.
Having determined that continuity of beneficial use was a fundamental
policy of the Water Rights Act, the court held the 1989 determination
within the range of discretion allowed by the Water Rights Act.
Hoskins' and Hale's finally argued that, even if the Department's
interpretation of "perfected" was appropriate, the court should require
the Department to express this definition as an administrative rule.
On this issue, the court held that rulemaking was not required in the
absence of express statutory text to the contrary. Because there was no
such statutory language in this case, the court did not require the
Department express their definition as an administrative rule.
Michael Sheehan

